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Abstract. This paper takes a multi-dimensional look at the theme of African futures. The plural 
nature of those futures comes out of the numerous differences that African states enjoy in terms of 
their comparative advantages and disadvantages. The primary angle of investigation, which highlights 
those differences, is the presence and engagement of the People’s Republic of China across the conti-
nent. The case of Rwanda in particular, is one through which many of the challenges and opportuni-
ties of future, Chinese-related, African scenarios may be analysed. First, the issue of partnership is 
touched upon in a post-colonial context, while referencing back to colonial rule and the continent’s 
inherited status in the world system. Second, the putative threat of ‘recolonization’ is examined with a 
focus on China’s Africa-policy. Third, Rwanda’s “home-grown” solutions to these and other problems 
are dealt with, shedding light on the landlocked East-Central African country’s investment policy, ap-
proach to external actors, including China, and it’s vision for its own future – the lessons of which are 
not confined to Rwanda alone. 
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Introduction: No more inferiority for Africa, but demand for partnership –  
Protection from Asia? 
 
Numerous countries of the African continent have, in recent years, registered substantial 
economic growth figures; against this background, and against an accentuated mantra of ‘Af-
rica Rising’, Africa’s future may look bright. If one takes a closer look at figures and indices, 
other than GDP, however, one has to realize that stark contrasts still prevail all across the con-
tinent. First of all, the level and volume of its connectedness and integration with the global 
system – in particular, its participation in the global economy and international trade – re-
minds us that a colonial type of international distribution of labour (raw materials-export ori-
entation), together with an external push to liberalize, are coupled with a decreasing weight of 
the continent in international trade. Africa’s six percent share of world export in 1980 had de-
clined to two percent in 2013; its share of world imports, meanwhile, fell from 4.6 percent in 
1980 to (again) two percent in 2013. As the Foundation for Democracy in Africa also pointed 
out in 2011, “Africa’s share of world trade has remained modest for several decades and to-
day hovers just above 3 percent of the world’s total volume of trade. It remains an important 
priority – and challenge – for Africa to further integrate itself into the world economy and ac-
count for an increasing share of global trade” (Foundation for Democracy in Africa, 2011: 1). 
By the second half of the 2010’s this proportion has not been changing, as UNCTAD and 
other international data sets show. Yet, as Evita Schmieg suggests, “for these countries, world 
                                                 
1
 This paper appears within the framework of the project “EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16-2017-00007-Young re-
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trade in fact plays a major role. In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, foreign trade – meas-
ured in terms of imports and exports of goods and services – represents more than 50 percent 
of GDP” (Schmieg 2016: 1). Dependency analysis reveals that the core countries still exploit 
the peripheries and especially their resources to get richer. Due to the fact that “tariffs on 
processed materials are higher than on the unprocessed materials,” as Collier argues, it is 
“harder for the countries of the bottom billion [including many low-income African countries] 
to diversify their exports by processing their raw materials before exporting them” (Collier 
2008: 160). This is coupled with many local protectionist policies, which favour trade barriers 
within these vulnerable African domestic markets. To be able to break out of a number of the 
traps of future development (including conflicts, the resource curse and bad governance), Af-
rican countries need to “diversify their exports into labour-using manufactures and services, 
the sort of things that Asia is already doing. […] to break into [global] markets they need 
temporary protection from Asia.” (Collier 2008: 167) 
Can African governments negotiate the problems of protection and relations with the out-
side world, however – and can they do in a realistic manner? Such realism is not always pre-
sent in the relevant contexts: as Chinua Achebe once wrote  
One of the commonest manifestations of underdevelopment is a tendency among the rul-
ing elite to live in a world of make-believe and unrealistic expectations. This is the cargo cult 
mentality – a belief by backward people that someday, without any exertion whatsoever on 
their own part, a fairy ship will dock in their harbour laden with every goody they have al-
ways dreamed of possessing. (Achebe 1983: 29)  
 ‘African agency’ has to stay firm and realistic in articulating what Africa wants, and how 
its future should look. To achieve this goal, meaningful partnerships with the external world 
are needed, as are ‘home-grown solutions’ for development: these may already be on the hori-
zon such as in the Rwandan case examined in this paper. Where all possible meaningful part-
nerships for African governments are concerned, Asian actors seem to have taken the lead in 
the last two decades. In addition to the heavyweight players such as China, India and Japan, a 
number of ‘unusual suspects’ have also appeared ‘in the loop’: Indonesia has been re-
intensifying its cooperation with the continent, while South Korea, Malaysia and even Thai-
land have sped up their (re-)engagements with African states. The Global North, in the mean-
time, has accumulated fears and reservations about China’s leading role in African develop-
ment. However, many Africans think their success for the future is intertwined with China’s 
active presence in their continent and in their everyday lives. Is this realistic? 
 
Understanding Chinese Engagement with Africa: Recolonization or Not? 
 
China’s expansion into Africa has ignited a harsh debate about its intentions towards the 
continent, especially where the political and economic consequences of its outreach to African 
states are concerned. While Beijing insists that its policies are still following the rules of 
“non-intervention” and can create “mutual benefits” (Davies et al. 2014: 181), the Western 
reaction is critical, alleging hidden intentions. Moyo, by analysing the literature, divides cur-
rently prevalent opinions on “China’s presence in Africa” into three different types or per-
spectives (Moyo 2016: 59).  
His first perspective is that which portrays a hegemonic China as a (re)colonizing force in 
Africa. This understanding has become a persistent Western media theme, one that can influ-
ence how we – and others – think about China’s African role. In the spring of 2018, for ex-
ample, Rex Tillerson, then the United States’ Secretary of State under President Donald 
Trump, warned African states that they should be careful with Chinese loans, and criticized 
Beijing’s general approach towards the continent. Tillerson was fired by President Donald 
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Trump a short time later, but his critique of Beijing’s whole approach to the continent high-
lighted the general criticisms of Chinese political and fiscal pressure on African governments. 
Chinese loans, it is argued there, are loans that “do not bring significant job creation locally”, 
and which “do not bring significant training programs that enable African citizens to partici-
pate more fully in the future . . . oftentimes the financing models are structured in a way that 
the country – when it gets into trouble financially – loses control of its own infrastructure or 
its own resources through default” (Koran 2018). But it is not just the loans that might 
threaten African economies with such risks. Chinese products, also, those that “have pene-
trated markets in many cities, towns, and villages across Africa” and this “has created con-
cerns for the development of local manufacturing chains and possibly deindustrialization 
spillovers for Africa” (Davies et al 2014: 183; see also Alden 2007). This is only one perspec-
tive on China-Africa relations today, however.  
Moyo’s second, alternative, perspective on those relations views China’s presence in Af-
rica as one that provides ‘room for manoeuver’ (Amin 2006) for African states that have for a 
long time been marginalized by Western domination (Moyo 2016: 59). In this perspective 
China is a balancing power, which can offer counter incentives for exploited countries. For a 
long time Western aid policies have defined not just the policies, but also the realities of these 
African countries. China, instead, offered them freedom in their internal political life, allow-
ing them to start thinking about development, outside of aid-defined Western-led programmes 
and suggestions. As Davies and his co-authors put it,  
China’s ‘no-strings’ financing offers African states that are otherwise not eligible to re-
ceive international loans, such as Sudan, a viable alternative. Many such countries are practi-
cally un-investable because of poor or non-existent credit ratings from international credit 
agencies” (Davies et al. 2014: 183-184). 
Then there is the third perspective, which builds on the preceding viewpoints by seeing 
China’s Africa policy as “one element of a broader process of primitive accumulation on a 
world scale in the context of a deepening crisis of capitalism (Moyo 2016: 59). China can thus 
be seen as a ‘sub-imperial’ force, one that is engaged in a scramble for African resources 
“only as a tributary component of Euro-American hegemony” (Moyo 2016: 59). This per-
spective can be critical about China’s engagement with Africa, but places that engagement in 
a broader context, one where all rising semi-peripheral countries are interested in Africa, tak-
ing part in the scramble alongside the Western states. This perspective considers the increas-
ing presence of other countries as well, such as Turkey through its infrastructure investments 
and cultural ties, Brazil through its South-South Initiatives, or other Asian countries, like In-
dia, Japan or Indonesia2, for instance. As Moyo puts it,  
investments from the Gulf region and various Asian countries (besides China) have 
grown, leading to an important shift in the world economic context. The diverse inter-state 
relations that have emerged are too complex to fit a straightforward re-colonization (and even 
sub-imperialism) process. Moyo 2016: 61). 
In spite of this, Moyo notes, when “discussing the idea of the scramble for Africa, much 
more is said about China in Africa than about India, Brazil, Turkey, the Gulf and other emerg-
ing countries” (Moyo 2016: 61). 
Three different perspectives, developed in response to one country’s entry into a conti-
nent, and the struggle of that highly heterogeneous, continent to deal with this entry. We can-
not uncover the real face of China if we still deal only with China-Africa trade and Chinese 
investments in Africa – these numbers, simplifying the global trends, can be attractive, but 
they might still hide the reality. Africa is definitely not a single country, and not even a single 
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region: each of its countries has unique and different economic environments, societies, po-
litical systems and cultural patterns, and, as Moyo concludes, they have diverse “resource en-
dowments of interest to a variety of foreign investors, of which China is but one” (Moyo 
2016: 58). This brings us to the China-centred view of these processes: China’s exports to-
wards Africa grew by 233% between 2006 and 2016 (Gandhi 2018: this author notes that dur-
ing the same period, however, India’s exports to Africa grew by 181%, Indonesia’s by 107%, 
Russia’s by 142% and Turkey’s by 192% ). Or, the fact that within that period, the European 
Union has remained Africa’s dominant trade partner, if we take into account the total values 
of imports and exports (Gandhi 2018). The Chinese need for raw materials often ends up in 
discussions about Chinese neo-colonialism, but looking at the same period, in 2006 (when 
China was already a net oil importer with an enormous economic growth), “China purchased 
only 9 percent of Africa’s petroleum exports in 2006 while the United States took 33% and 
Europe 36%” (Shinn 2007). By 2016, the situation had changed, not only because of Chinese 
growth, but also because of the US’ decision to decrease its import dependency and rely more 
on its own oilfields. Collected from several sources, Africa’s oil exports were 6.2 Mb/d in 
2016 (BP 2017), while China imported around 7.6 Mb/d that year (EIA 2017), from which 1.4 
Mb/d arrived from Africa (Albert 2017), making Beijing responsible for roughly 23% of the 
African oil exports – again not dominating the sector (even if it is becoming the biggest ac-
tor). 
Analysing this approach, we have to consider several layers, and so, China’s presence in 
Africa cannot be summed up with reference to one single role played by that country alone. 
This has certain political implications. As Conteh-Morgan (2015: 31) puts it, “China’s en-
gagement with Africa has become an emotional subject”, one which is generating both posi-
tive and negative comments: 
Western hegemonic powers are the source of a great deal of negative framing of China’s 
intentions, including such matters as (1) China’s noncritical stance regarding human rights 
violations in Africa; (2) its economic support for authoritarian rulers and diplomatic support 
at the UN and other international bodies; and (3) its economic support to African governments 
without imposing any conditions for democracy and good governance in general. (Conteh-
Morgan 2015: 31)  
However, African states are guilty of turning blind eyes as well: fear of losing their bal-
ancing power makes them not to mention critical or challenging points, issues, and to over-
look possible Chinese mistakes. The presence of China in Africa can only be described with 
all three perspectives: awareness of the steps that might lead to (re)colonization processes, 
acceptance of the possibility that China may act as a balancing power, and, finally, an under-
standing of globalization as a process that is definitely complex, but is certainly not fair and 
equal process. The foreign (as well as aid, trade and security) policy of the People’s Republic 
of China in the 21st century can only be made sense of in this way. 
Rex Tillerson might not understand Chinese foreign policy, but Chinese loans (as well) 
do have a darker side: eventually you will have to repay them, which is not that easy. These 
loans were never forced on their recipients by China; they were, and remain, the most attrac-
tive out of the multiple opportunities offered to those recipients by other countries and finan-
cial organizations. Without any conditions, Beijing is ready to offer financial help. This 
means, first of all, a threat to the aid schemes and loans through which Western powers have 
controlled African government spending and policies for decades, and are, thus, a threat to 
Western interests. For already indebted African countries it can be a threat as well: for those 
who fail to receive loans from other countries, this can be a huge burden. While the Chinese 
loans are concessional, with lower interest rates or longer grace periods, if projects fail to 
generate the desired returns, then governments that sponsor them may find themselves in even 
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bigger trouble than before. A “China-is-colonizing-Africa” perspective would be well suited 
to the crises that would ensue from such failure. However, secondly, this financial help also 
offers a space, in which these countries can make independent decisions and start investment 
programmes outside of Western-dictated rules. It might end up in new ports, railways, or di-
versification of the economy. In this perspective, China shows up as a partner who under-
stands Africa – as we will later see. With this approach China can be the balancing power, 
rivalling the Western interests and offering these countries some “room for manoeuvre”.  
Finally, through these loans, China may (possibly) develop a market for itself, not just in 
terms of where they can export, but also where they can start infrastructure projects with their 
state-owned companies (SOEs), helping the Chinese economy. Again, China is not the only 
one interested in these possible investments, but is, so far, undoubtedly the most successful 
one. In a broader context, this new “Scramble for Africa” is like a running competition, where 
China is Usain Bolt.  
For years, the accusation against China was that it only invested in countries that had de-
sirable raw materials or other resources, and that through such investments Beijing has liter-
ally been colonizing the continent. Well, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows 
into Africa have definitely increased rapidly: “China has invested in 293 FDI projects in Af-
rica since 2005, totalling an investment outlay of $66.4 billion and creating 130,750 jobs. . . 
Chinese FDI into Africa is well diversified across various sectors, covering resource-oriented 
ones as well as services and manufacturing” (Dibie 2017). In spite of this, however, China is 
still far from being a hegemonic recolonizer, for, as McMillan noted, “African countries make 
up less than four percent of China’s global trade and less than three percent of China’s global 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and stocks” (McMillan 2017). Similarly, China only 
accounted for around five percent of global FDI into Africa in 2015 (McMillan 2017).  
Brautigam has been trying to uncover the true face of China for years now, fighting 
against the one-sided reports, and in a paper with her colleagues, she affirmed that their FDI 
has started to diversify, as her co-author commented in a blog entry. “While mining and 
construction still account for the bulk (54%), the stock of manufacturing FDI increased to 
13% of China’s FDI stocks in Africa in 2015. […] Chinese FDI in Africa has started to di-
versify away from the traditional recipients of global FDI into high-growth countries that 
are not necessarily resource-rich” (McMillan, 2017). Chinese FDI and loans have certainly 
increased in their volume in numerous African countries, but the scenario is not fundamen-
tally different from other countries’ practices. All of them are first and foremost interested 
in investing in resource extraction, and the big question remains: what else do they offer to 
Africa?  
These investments, however, diversified or not, or the loans, even with a lower interest 
rate, do not benefit both sides equally, as China still sticks to its State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) where implementation is concerned (for example, in infrastructure investments). In 
the long run this can weaken the economy of the African countries: first of all, quality is still 
an important issue with these SOEs, and African countries have to rigorously check these in-
vestments to ensure that they are appropriate for upcoming decades. Secondly, African coun-
tries should insist that local companies are involved in such projects. China pushes its SOEs 
into African markets, too, because of the country’s burning economic pressures to keep its 
GDP growth and to maintain the smooth running of the Chinese economy. African states have 
to be critical, since beside the Chinese companies, Turkish, Brazilian, Indian and other com-
panies are waiting in the line. This could create a healthy competition, from which Africans 
can potentially maximize their own benefits. Rwanda, ‘Africa’s Singapore’ (according to the 
hopes of President Paul Kagame) is just the right country to prove that only this multi-
perspective view can help us understand the Chinese presence in the African countries.  
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Today’s realities – tomorrow’s dreams – Focus on Rwanda 
 
For any investment, a politically and economically stable and secure environment is in-
dispensable. Some actors are less cautious than others, but security is of utmost importance 
for each of them. To be able to attract FDI, Africa needs to work out policies and daily behav-
iours, which can convince any possible investor to enter their markets. Obviously, countries 
of the continent – due to their realities, whether or not they experience ongoing armed con-
flicts across their lands, or how open their local markets are, how far they are integrated into 
at least a regional economic community – differ a lot in what they are able to offer for their 
potential would-be partner. Although Chinese actors had shown bravery in some cases in the 
past to enter even a less reliable market, today, the Go Global strategy of the People’s Repub-
lic of China advocates more caution and calculation in any investment or acquisition scheme. 
Those countries with more safeguards (and still with ‘room to manoeuvre’ for the sake of the 
best deal) can expect larger volumes of Chinese money and engagement. One of the best ex-
amples for this is the small landlocked East-Central African country of Rwanda. 
The Rwandan case is particularly interesting for the discourse on Africa’s futures: on the 
one hand, the country “suffers from a number of quite severe disadvantages. Landlocked, un-
der-endowed with natural resources […] and with an exceptionally unfavourable person-land 
ratio, it continues to be extremely poor in per capita income and human-development terms” 
(Kelsall 2013: 120). On the other hand, the post-genocide period has shown numerous posi-
tive results in basically all walks of life. During comparative field research conducted by the 
authors in 2015 and 2016, several Rwandan interviewees confirmed the growing number of 
economic opportunities in their country. The Vision 2020 national development plan 
(launched in 2000) also speaks about transforming Rwanda into a knowledge-based middle-
income country. This is strictly driven by the Kagame-led government, which at the same 
time has installed developmental patrimonialism as the ruling ideology of both the govern-
ment and the country. A country under that ideology is one where “the ruling elite acquires an 
interest in, and a capability for, managing economic rents in a centralized way with a view to 
enhancing their own and others’ income in the long run rather than maximizing them in the 
short run” (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2017: 171). 
One of the vehicles of the country’s transformation is the Rwandan Development Board 
(RDB). It focuses on investment promotion and contributes to a services-oriented economy 
for the future. As Yvette Mutoni, then head of investment promotion in RDB, explained to the 
present authors3, tourism has been planned to become one of the main drivers of a bright fu-
ture. In particular, conference tourism with all the newest and modern facilities in Kigali City 
is meant to position Rwanda as the leading actor in East Africa. To be able the attract more 
companies into this sector the RDB offers a one-stop centre to register any company in the 
country: in just about six hours on the ground floor of the RDB building all the necessary pa-
perwork can be easily done. In addition, the government has been making progress in bring-
ing down the costs of running any business, especially where electricity costs are concerned. 
Yet another significant step to attract FDI is to provide procurement procedures that are as 
transparent as possible. Proposals are thus double checked in all sectors, and the state organ 
responsible for all this is the Rwanda Standards Board (RSB), governed by a Board of Direc-
tors composed of major stakeholders from government, industry and academic institutions, as 
well as from consumer associations.4 
                                                 
3
 Interview recorded on March 24, 2015, in the headquarters of the RDB. 
4
 See: http://www.rsb.gov.rw/quick-nav/home.html 
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The overall picture of Rwanda is one of “sound macroeconomic management and strong 
growth, albeit with some concerns about external dependence, external balance, and structural 
transformation. GDP growth averaged 6.8 percent per year between 2002 and 2010” (Kelsall 
2013: 141). According to Trading Economics, Rwanda’s economy grew very well in 2017, 
growing by 10.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2017, the most since the third quarter of 
2014, and following an 8 percent expansion in the previous period of that year. The service 
sector grew by 11 percent (10 percent in Q3), mainly due to trade administrative and support 
service activities, and to wholesale and retail trade. In addition, agriculture increased 10 per-
cent. (Trading Economics 2017)  
If we look at the different sectors, services have gained the most, but at the same time the 
financial sector, as well as the communications sector, together with the transport sector have 
grown stronger substantially. “Construction has been another lead sector, driven in part by 
large infrastructural investments. […] [At the same time] the balance of payments is being 
helped by rapid increases of FDI” (Kelsall 2013: 141). With regard to construction, especially 
that of physical infrastructure (badly needed all across the country), the role of external actors 
were highlighted in an interview with President Kagame, conducted in the Cabinet Meeting 
Room in the Presidency Compound on March 24, 2015. Rwanda’s president acknowledged 
the Chinese presence in Africa, but compared it with the same country’s presence in Europe, 
asking “if this is good for Europe, why cannot it be good for Africa?” He also added that if 
“things go wrong [in a project, for instance], it is not only the Chinese’ fault, because if things 
do not have ownership, things cannot be going into a good direction.”5 All these statements 
also highlight the stubborn way required for the future: African countries to go their own 
ways in a systematic and also self-critical manner, always learning both from their past and 
the current successes and failures of others. China, from this angle, is certainly a point of ref-
erence for many, including Rwanda. 
 
China in Rwanda 
 
Rwanda, with all its disadvantages, is at first glance hardly the most attractive partner for 
China. If the latter were only recolonizers, they would surely not be interested in the Eastern 
African country. Still, Beijing is as active in the country as it is in other African states, per-
haps even more so: the Asian giant is Rwanda’s second6 biggest source of FDI, mainly in the 
manufacturing and real estate sectors, and its “greatest support to Rwanda’s development 
process is in the form of concessional loans, grant aid, technical support in major infrastruc-
ture projects as well as students’ scholarships in critical sectors such as health, education and 
technology.”7 
The two states established political relations as early as 1971, and since the 1994 geno-
cide Chinese assistance has played an important role in Rwanda’s health and education sec-
tors. When analysing the Chinese approach in Rwanda, Habyarimana and Wu tried to under-
stand why Beijing is interested in such a country, looking at strategic, social development and 
economic motives (Habyarimana and Wu 2017: 67 – 70), and concluded that stability is a key 
indicator in Rwanda’s success. The country’s goal of becoming Africa’s Singapore has been 
strongly assisted by its “stability and security” (Waldorf 2017: 84). At first sight, Singapore 
has better conditions with its ports and strategic position versus the landlocked African state, 
                                                 
5
 Interview recorded on March 24, 2015, in Kigali. 
6
 The country’s biggest source of such investment is the European Union.  
7
 See: China, Rwanda to further boost relations, says Chinese foreign minister. January 14, 2018, 
The New Times Rwanda. Available at: http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/227569 
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but Rwanda can offer even more than its already outstanding stability: it is close to vital mar-
kets in East and Southern Africa, and has additional connections towards Central Africa. The 
U.S. Commercial Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, for example, notes that not 
only has the country an internal market of 11.8 million people with a ‘growing middle class’, 
but also ‘a market potential of 162 million consumers in the East Africa Community (EAC)’, 
as well as easy access ‘to the Eastern DRC market of approximately 35 million people’ 
(2017). 
So, a growing domestic market, a mature and dynamic private sector, a leading politi-
cal role in the region (and the status of a respected power in both Africa and the wider 
world), a liberal and secure investment environment, a high quality and cost effective la-
bour force, a customs union with EAC countries, a developed infrastructure, an institu-
tionalized economy and a competitive tax system all characterize the country (Habyari-
mana and Wu 2017: 70), making it attractive together with its position. Rwanda is the 
“second easiest place to do business in sub-Saharan Africa. Investors can register a busi-
ness online or in person in as fast as six hours through the Rwanda Development Board” 
(Habyarimana and Wu 2017: 70) – something that was confirmed during our own field 
research. The RDB – which many African countries want to copy – controls investments 
in the country and is responsible for quality control as well, deciding about projects and 
concessions. The Kigali Convention Centre, which hosted the 27th AU Summit in 20168, 
has the story of a Chinese success and failure as well. “In 2009 a Chinese construction 
firm, the Beijing Construction Engineering Group (BCEG) was entrusted to implement the 
German-designed blueprint for the project. But the opening, which was initially scheduled 
for 2011 had to be postponed several times. This led to discrepancies between the Rwan-
dan building contractor and the Chinese construction firm, which ultimately led to the “re-
allocation of the project to Summa, a Turkish Engineering firm” (Opobo 2016). It was this 
firm, in the end, who finished the project, a fact that offers us some interesting implica-
tions:  
1. As Davies et al. noted, “the term ‘state capitalism’ is regularly used when describing 
this government–corporate alignment [of China], but in many instances, it may be overly 
simplistic when describing the Chinese government’s strategy toward Africa. Chinese SOE’s 
are often very competitive with each other for contracts in Africa; at times, they are more 
competitive than they are collaborative. The phrase ‘state capitalism’ might imply a mono-
lithic order, but in China, this is not the case (Davies et al. 2014: 182). The case of the Con-
vention Centre shows us, even if there is a pressure from the government, their companies 
face competition, and with competition, they face requirements as well.  
2. The Chinese presence, if it leads to a balance of power, can create competition as well, 
eventually helping African states to find the best solution – finance-wise, as well.  
3. These companies have to be checked and controlled, an activity which is the responsi-
bility of African states. The balancing role cannot come with immunity against corruption or 
bad quality. Rwandan authorities were ready to rescind the presence in their country of a Chi-
nese company, undermining the recolonization theory (at least as and the only valid perspec-
tive). As Moyo notes, “the China recolonization thesis assumes that there is a dominance of 
Chinese capital in Africa and that the Chinese state now has greater influence on African 
states. However, the empirical evidence on the situation on the ground shows that China’s in-
creased presence in Africa is only relatively high in recent times and, when compared with the 
                                                 
8
 See: https://au.int/en/summit/27 
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overall presence of Euro-American-based capital in Africa, it is far from being dominant” 
(Moyo, 2016: 59).9 
4. Finally, a Turkish company took over the job, reflecting on the global scramble for Af-
rica, also showing: Chinese are neither the sole powers, nor the only solutions there.  
 
A different approach towards Chinese investments is needed for the future 
 
On our 2015 field trip in Rwanda during our discussion with President Kagame we raised 
a question about China, if he considers their presence an advantageous one, or not. The an-
swer, as coherent and clear as it could be, was a definite affirmation, adding the fact that there 
are challenges, but what he could feel is that what they want from Africa, can benefit the Af-
rican countries: to avoid any problems the ones (meaning African governments) making the 
deal have to stand firm and coherent, reflecting on the much needed and praised African Ren-
aissance.  
These countries have to closely monitor all such (not just Chinese) activities, not to 
weaken their economies for the long run, to maximize the profits and benefits for the society, 
to introduce methods and investments which can help their economies and processes, not fur-
thering exploitative methods. The opinion and the Rwandan situation reflects on the phe-
nomenon that Chinese companies can introduce failed methods, but if used and controlled in a 
better way this can offer a “room for manoeuvre” and power to make better deals with West-
ern actors as well. And as we could see through the case of Rwanda: further countries (Tur-
key, Brazil, etc.) can be used for a bargaining power against China as well. It all depends on 
these African countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There are many African futures, not just one. As long as there are differences across 
countries in many aspects ranging from economic performance to stability, from strong cen-
tral administration to more regions-focussed approaches, national strategies and plans of de-
velopment naturally vary, also taking into account factual features of the country and realities 
of everyday life. In addition to inherited structures, processes to organize governance and 
public administration (from the colonial period), African states have been experimenting with 
many ‘own African ways’. The Rwandan case has shown that its ‘home-grown solutions’ – 
also motivated by Singapore’s model of development in part – can summarize what such an 
African country can realistically hope for the future. Although many steps have been rigor-
ously and consistently taken to achieve its goals, we can agree with Kelsall that to have such a 
success story be sustainable, “and increased institutionalization of power is probably re-
quired” (Kelsall 2013: 144). 
 
                                                 
9
 Moyo further notes that “the recolonization thesis is mainly posited by various liberal Western 
scholars and is widely floated in the mainstream media, as well as by some African scholars, using the 
epitaph of the destructive dragon” (Moyo 2016: 59). To underline this statement, he focuses on land 
grabbing and the media coverage of land grabbing in Africa: “The recent increase in the acquisition of 
large scale landholding by foreign entities is another area in which China’s presence in Africa is be-
lieved to have grown. However, when we examine the data relating to land grabbing in Africa […] 
China is not the major land grabber. China and India, plus all the other semi-peripheries (e.g. Turkey, 
the Gulf), have attempted to acquire less than 40% of the grabbed land. Instead, numerous multina-
tional companies from America, Europe and Scandinavia, (which are relatively new in the foreign re-
source grab game) are the dominant players involved in the land grab” (ibid. 63-64). 
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Аннотация. Эта статья представляет собой многогранный взгляд на тему африканского 
будущего, чей множественный характер вытекает из многочисленных различий между афри-
канскими государствами с точки зрения их сравнительных преимуществ и недостатков. Глу-
бокое проникновение Китайской Народной Республики на континент является основным на-
правлением исследования, подчеркивающим эти различия. В частности, в случае с Руандой 
можно проанализировать многие проблемы и возможности будущих вариантов развития со-
бытий в Африке, связанных с Китаем. Во-первых, вопрос о партнерстве затрагивается в по-
стколониальном контексте, тогда как он служит отсылкой ко временам колониального гос-
подства и унаследованному статусу континента в мировой международной системе. Во-вто-
рых, возможная угроза «реколонизации» рассматривается с акцентом на африканскую поли-
тику Китая. В-третьих, разбираются собственные решения Руанды этих и других проблем, 
проливая свет на инвестиционную политику, попытки сблизиться с внешними акторами, 
включая Китай, этой не имеющей выхода к морю восточно-центральноафриканской страны, 
чье видение собственного будущего – урок, не ограничивающийся одной Руандой  
 
Ключевые слова: Руанда, развитие, патримониализм, китайско-африканское партнерст-
во, реколонизация 
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